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Migration, Minorities, and Refugeehood in Cyprus: A View of the Citizenship Regime 






Generally known for its long-standing conflict, Cyprus is a place where the migration and 
refugee regimes, operating on either side of a dividing line, are imbricated in the legacies and 
discourses of the inter-ethnic dispute (Demetriou, 2018). This is largely because citizenship on 
both sides is framed by a binary logic and informed by the history of displacement on the island 
in the last century. This article analyses the dynamics involved in these relationships in order to 
explain how the governance of migration, minorities, and refugeehood stem from the politics of 
citizenship.  
 
The article is divided into two sections. The first section will offer an overview of the formation 
of migrant, minority, and refugee communities on the island. It will thus first provide a history of 
migration movements on the island as a way of introducing the political and demographic 
complexities that make up Cypriot society today. Secondly, it will discuss further the governance 
of otherness on the island, particularly relating to different minority groups. Thirdly, it will 
provide an overview of the displacements induced by the Cyprus conflict. Fourthly, it will 
discuss the policies relating to refugee protection over the last two decades.  
 
The second section will focus on the analysis of the governance of migrant, minority, and 
refugee groups within the citizenship regime. It will thus first provide an overview of the 
premises of citizenship on which belonging to the island is understood in law and practice. 
Secondly, it will explain how the governance of others relates to this framing of citizenship. 
Thirdly, it will present demographic data to exemplify the implications of these dynamics. 
Finally, it will summarise these relations and conclude with thoughts about policy and practice.  
 
The article is partly based on data presented in a 2019 report on migration and its relation to the 
Cyprus conflict (Demetriou, 2019). It draws largely on ethnographic observations carried out 
over two decades of engagement on the island, numerous interviews with practitioners in related 
fields, and substantial desk research on law, policy, public discourse, and civic activity.  
 
The main claim in this article is that the conflict in Cyprus cannot be delinked from 
understandings of citizenship and that in turn, these understandings cannot be separated from 
the governance of minorities, migrants, and refugees. In short, the entire socio-political sphere in 
Cyprus is imbued with the construction of a post-conflict subject as a refugee subject, which is 
always an ongoing process.  This means that whatever legal categories are used to govern those 
subjects, displacement within the conflict is always at heart of conceptualisations of otherness 
and belonging on the island.   










1. Historical and Political Background to Migration Movements 
Cyprus has a long history of migration and forced displacement. The island is often presented in 
local discourse, including history books, as having diachronically sat ‘at the crossroads of 
civilizations’, and cultural influences are celebrated for their blending of eastern and western 
elements (Panayiotopoulos and Nicolaidou, 2007). Significantly, all of Cyprus’s local population 
groups identify their origins elsewhere. Greek-Cypriots often trace their cultural lineage all the 
way back to the Achaean Greeks who colonized the island from the 12th century BC. Maronites 
find their roots in communities that emigrated from present-day Syria and Lebanon from the 9th 
century AD and through the Middle Ages. Latins claim heritage from Levantine groups that 
settled on the island during the Crusades and particularly the Lusignan and Venetian rulers 
(1192-1489 and 1489-1521). In the absence of a formalised history of the Roma population, it is 
speculated that the Roma settlement on the island took place in the 14th century and was related 
to population movements during the time of the Crusades. Turkish-Cypriots trace their roots to 
the Ottomans who conquered the island in 1521, and Armenians often have family histories of 
descendants settling in Cyprus after the genocide of 1915. Thus, the population of the island is a 
population identified by migration as well as by conflict.1  
 
In the more recent past, population movements related largely to internal displacements resulting 
from the inter-ethnic violence of the conflict, outlined below. The year of the Republic’s 
establishment, 1960, saw independence from colonial rule by Britain through the establishment 
of a constitution determining the status of various groups of citizens overviewed in the next 
section. As violence flared in 1963 with the breakup of the bicommunal state, the greater part of 
the internally displaced populations until 1974 were Turkish-Cypriots, whereas after the war of 
1974 and the division of the island, Greek-Cypriots from the north became displaced to the 
south the Turkish-Cypriot from the south became displaced to the north. After 1974, most 
migration movements concerned the emigration of Cypriots for work, and the settling of 
populations from Turkey in the north of the island.2  
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, migration patterns changed for both parts of the 
island. Ethnic Greeks and Turks from former Soviet Union republics could migrate to Greece 
and Turkey under repatriation schemes (Voutira, 1991; 2004; 2006; 2011), and from there to 
Cyprus. In the 1990s, as the economy--particularly in the south--was booming, labour migration 
policies were also instituted, allowing migration from the global south, mainly for domestic and 
agricultural work (Sainsbury, 2009). Irregularity and its policing gradually became more visible in 
public discourse, as visa permissions and restrictions became more stringently regulated. Similar 
work schemes in the north saw an increase in migration for domestic work, but targeted Turkic 
groups from Central Asia. Human rights issues also began to gradually surface, and trafficking 
for sexual exploitation gained attention as an issue on both sides as of the early 2000s 
(Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Agathangelou, 2004; Vassiliadou, 2004).  
 
A system of refugee protection under the terms of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (henceforth “the Convention”) was put in place in the 2000s in the Republic 
of Cyprus, whose largely Greek-Cypriot authorities in practice exercise control over the southern 
part of the island since the division of 1974 (the north being controlled by Turkish-Cypriot 
authorities and largely dependent on Turkey). The Republic effectively took over from UNHCR, 
at this point, as the latter had been stationed on the island since the 1960s and had been active in 
 
1 Studies on the groups mentioned can be found in Varnava, Coureas and Elia (2009), Coureas (2000), Pattie (1997; 
2013), Constantinou (2007), Nevzat (2005), Erdal Ilican (2011). 
2 Early studies of displacement in Cyprus include Evdokas et al (1976), Volkan (1980), Loizos (1981), Zetter (1991). 
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protecting internally displaced Cypriots in the 1960s and 1970s and then shifted its focus from 
Cypriot displaced populations to foreign refugees. The entry of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 
meant that the asylum system was streamlined with EU directives since the early 2000s. By 
extension, much of migration policy that hinges on irregular migration and refugee protection 
also came within the purview of EU legislation. Free movement within the EU also meant that 
migration from new entrant countries in particular also increased (Mainwaring, 2012; 2014; 
Trimikliniotis, 2001).  
 
At present, Cypriot migration policy is intimately tied to EU policies with respect to the south 
and to Turkish policy with respect to the north. This creates a situation whereby migration 
dynamics and demographics vary substantially between the two sides. The on-going stalemate of 
the conflict also means that there is no communication between the two sides so that policy may 
be coordinated. And yet, the policing of migration takes account of the conflict in various ways, 
starting with the status of the Green Line, and with the territorial dispute.  
 
A case in point is the governance of refugee protection during the COVID-19 pandemic which 
imposed severe restrictions of movement in Cyprus over the last year. Since the start of the 
pandemic in March 2020, strict lockdowns were implemented on both sides of the island lasting 
until the early summer months. Cases of infection were overall well managed, during this first 
phase at least, on both sides, but this was largely due to the island’s halting of all passenger air 
traffic. In addition, and prior to the closing of airports on both sides, movement across the 
Green Line, which had been possible since 2003, was also halted. This had an impact on 
refugees who had up to then been crossing the Green Line and seeking asylum in the south, 
having arrived in the north, mainly from Turkey. It is indicative that right after the lockdown was 
announced by authorities of the Republic on March 15, a boat of Syrian refugees was pushed 
back by Greek-Cypriot marine patrols and forced to disembark in the north of the island, where 
no asylum procedures exist.3 As of the time of writing further pushback have been reported, 
while reports also surfaced of refugees stranded on the Green Line, unable to cross into the 
south or return to the north.4   
 
 
2. The Governance of Minority Groups  
The way in which minority groups are governed in Cyprus intersects with the experience of 
displacement on the island in mostly indirect ways. Minority groups have generally not been 
targeted for displacement because of their minority status but rather because this status was 
treated as membership of larger community groups, i.e. either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish-
Cypriot community. 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, as will be explained further below, 
recognises three groups as religious groups rather than ethnic minority groups. These are the 
Armenian, Maronite, and Latin communities. In terms of citizenship, all three groups are 
counted as members of the Greek-Cypriot community. Each of these groups trace their origins 
within migration movements tied to the history of the island. They are also connected to specific 
locations: for example, large Maronites communities lived in a village cluster in the northwest of 
the island prior to their internal displacement in 1974. Armenians lived in Turkish quarters, 
mainly in Nicosia prior to their displacement in 1964. Because of the locations they inhabited, 
these two groups experienced displacement very differently. Maronites were able to maintain 
residence rights in their origin villages through the years of division. Armenians, who lived in 
 
3 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/30/cyprus-pushes-syrian-refugees-back-at-sea-due-to-coronavirus  
4 https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/9/26/iranian-asylum-seeker-stuck-in-limbo-on-divided-cyprus  
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Turkish-Cypriot urban neighbourhoods in large numbers prior to the eruption of violence were 
not recognised initially as having been displaced and did not receive effective assistance. This 
was because they were displaced as members of the Greek-Cypriot community (to which they 
belonged) and therefore the assistance that was being offered at that time by UNHCR was 
focused on Turkish-Cypriots, who were bearing the brunt of the violence (Demetriou 2014; 
2018). The Latin community is the smallest in size and has been integrated to a larger extent 
within the Greek-Cypriot community. Their displacement experience does not differ significantly 
from the Greek-Cypriot population at large.  
 
Thus in effect, the organisation of these three groups into religious groups that are part of the 
Greek-Cypriot community, has defined their displacement experience. However, in doing so, it 
has differentiated it, because of the fact that the locations from which they were displaced and 
the times of their displacement, in terms of conflict phases, differed. While in the case of the 
Maronites this experience allowed greater possibilities for return that the rest of the Greek-
Cypriot population, in the case of the Armenians it allowed lesser access to assistance. These 
differentiations were not directly tied to ethnicity, but rather indirectly linked to it via time and 
place.    
 
This differentiation is also tied to wider political alliances. Politically, as religious groups, the 
three minorities are led by religious leaders. However, they maintain ties with states and 
diasporas to differing degrees. The Vatican has been important in mediating rights in the cases of 
Maronites and Latins (Constantinou, 2007). The Armenian community has strong links with 
Armenian diasporas and the Armenian state. Internally, however, the three groups lack formal 
representation in government. Three elected representatives, one for each, sit in parliament and 
advocate for the interests of the groups but have no voting rights.  Community members vote in 
national elections as Greek-Cypriots. In the north, Maronite and Greek-Cypriot groups who 
remained behind following the division were treated as minorities with voting rights limited to 
local rather than general elections. This in effect means that the governance of otherness within 
the citizenship regime allows little room for collective representation. It is rather guided by 
cultural assumptions. Minorities are thus often unseen and unheard in discussions about politics 
on the island and particularly the Cyprus conflict. This means that their rights as displaced 
populations are also circumscribed within that governance (Demetriou, 2016; 2018)  
 
There is another minority group however, that is not included in the recognised religious groups. 
These are the Roma, who are not recognised formally in law. They instead form part of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, living across the north and the south and often maintaining family 
ties across the divide. In the south, they are afforded rights as Turkish-Cypriot community 
members. Some language provision is also provided within the education system in specific 
schools in the town of Limassol. Other groups within the Turkish-Cypriot community also 
include people of African descent studied by artist Serap Kanay.5 These unrecognised groups are 
not subject to specific policies and are largely understudied and not well organised. For these 
reasons it is difficult to assess how the governance of citizenship, or aspects of the Cyprus 
conflict, including displacement, may have affected them. 
 
Newer minority groups were formed by migration movements in the last five decades. The 
governance of these groups has also largely fallen within the parameters of the dichotomic 
distinction between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities (whose constitutional 
aspects are explored in section 2). This means that if in the south, they naturalise into citizenship 




citizens of the self-declared state there, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (henceforth 
TRNC). In effect then, both polities assume an ethnic aspect to their citizenship regimes that 
does not correspond to the identities of many of their subjects. These creates a situation whereby 
many groups in Cyprus are “minoritised” (Demetriou, 2013), i.e. placed in a position of 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the assumptions of homogeneity that understandings of Cypriot identity 
imply on both sides of the island. This disadvantage is largely also class-related and separates the 
experience of migrant communities from communities of individuals who naturalise through 
investment schemes – a policy that has been introduced in the Republic in the last decade 
(Rakopoulos, forthcoming). Thus it could be said that wealth is now becoming a factor replacing 
ethnicity in the determination of how otherness is governed in Cyprus.     
 
 
3. Displacement relating to the Cyprus Conflict 
The conflict between the two main ethnic communities has been the key driver of displacement 
in Cyprus’ modern history. This displacement has taken many forms, however. It has included 
movements that we today recognise as “internal displacement”, for example Turkish-Cypriots 
(chiefly) in the 1960s and movements north and south of the Green Line after 1974. It has also 
included movements across country borders of people fleeing violence or targeting, for example 
during the EOKA campaign in the 1950s and the violence of the 1960s: these may be today 
recognised as “refugee” movements, however, in many cases they did not involve recognition by 
state authorities as such. They were seen at the time as migration movements. Yet other 
movements, post-1974, were induced by poverty and dispossession that followed the war but 
were again seen as migratory rather than forced. In examining the spectrum of displacement in 
the recent history of the island therefore, it is important to account for all these different types 
of movement. It is also important to remember that these movements took place within a larger 
temporal context where Cyprus also hosted incoming refugees from elsewhere, like the 
Armenian community after the genocide of 1914 and more recent refugee arrivals, for example 
since the 1980s with the war in Lebanon.      
 
During the anticolonial struggle (1955-1959), in which the Greek-Cypriot nationalist 
organisation EOKA sought unification with Greece towards the end of British colonial rule 
(1878-1960), colonists as well as Turkish-Cypriots who were seen as an impediment to the goal 
of the struggle, and Greek-Cypriots who were seen as liabilities were targeted. The formation of 
the Turkish nationalist organisation TMT escalated the violence further, inter-ethnically and 
within communities. Even though migration movements pre-existed this period (Smith and 
Varnava, 2017), Cypriots migrated at this point particularly to the UK to escape the violence, 
either because they felt directly targeted (French, 2017) or due to the general insecurity. 
Displacements within the island also occurred, particularly around specific neighbourhoods, but 
were rather small scale and not subject to any reparation policies.  
 
Following independence in 1960, inter-ethnic violence persisted and resulted in the 
separation of the territory, with Turkish-Cypriots leaving the power-sharing government and 
taking refuge in enclave pockets scattered around the island. At that point, large numbers of the 
Turkish-Cypriot population became displaced and significant numbers left the island altogether, 
emigrating to other countries in the Commonwealth, Australia being a favoured destination in 
addition to the UK (Cahill, 2015). Within the island, members of other communities were also 
displaced, for example, Armenians (who, under the terms of the 1960 constitution of the 
Republic of Cyprus, were counted as members of the Greek-Cypriot community) and Greek-
Cypriots who lived in areas that became enclaves. In this period, the UNHCR set up an office on 
the island, which focused its work on the Turkish-Cypriot population, since this was the 
population that lacked the protection of the state. The Greek-Cypriots and Armenians who were 
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displaced did not receive effective support as they fell under the ill-defined category of people 
“struck by the Turks” (Tourkoplikti) – a term with no legal validity, which was used by the 
Greek-Cypriot press of the time to lay the blame for the violence on the Turkish-Cypriot 
community (Demetriou 2014, 2018). The term was to be revisited in the early 2000s and become 
a legal definition, used as a subcategory of those internally displaced and their children, who were 
now afforded limited rights to housing loans.    
 
The next phase of the conflict was the war of 1974, prompted by a military coup against 
the Greek-Cypriot government organised by the junta regime in Greece (1967-1974) with a view 
to effecting the island’s union with Greece, and the subsequent invasion by Turkey in order to 
protect the Turkish-Cypriot community from violence. This was the most traumatic in terms of 
displacement, because it left large numbers of the population displaced, the majority of them 
Greek-Cypriots. This Greek-Cypriot population, estimated officially at 200,000, has been the 
main referent of the appellation ‘Cypriot refugee’ for the last five decades – the implied exclusion 
of other population groups from this concept owes much to the political ways in which 
displacement has been read. Greek-Cypriot discourse prioritises 1974 over earlier periods, while 
Turkish-Cypriot discourse downplays the relevance of displacement as a traumatic experience by 
comparison to the deliverance found in the post-1974 situation (Demetriou, 2018a). This history 
of displacement in modern history is important to the reception of refugees today, because it has 
put in place structures and discourses that have an impact on such reception on both sides, to 
this day.    
 
Since 1974, migration into Cyprus has taken different forms, some forced and tied to 
displacements from elsewhere, others less so. In the north, populations from Turkey were settled 
in various phases on order to boost population and development. They were incentivised by 
property and land offers-- in houses and areas that had been vacated by Greek-Cypriot 
populations fleeing the war (Erdal Ilican, 2011). In some cases they were also settled in Cyprus 
after being displaced from areas in Turkey that were subject to large scale development projects 
or that were affected by the war against Kurdish insurgents. This policy of settlement has been 
heavily criticised by the RoC government, as well as international actors, as a measure designed 
to cement the effects of the war on the ground, in the absence of a political agreement ending 
the war. The populations thus defined as ‘settlers’ are hence largely seen on the Greek-Cypriot 
side as having illegitimate claims to being in Cyprus and their presence on the island over the last 
four decades is seen as an on-going war crime. Within that time however, further migrations 
took place into northern Cyprus, of Turkish nationals who arrived independently of formal 
settlement policy, as well as of ethnic Turks from other areas, who arrived as part of such 
policies. These movements also involved displacement as for example I the case of the 
population of Bulgarian Turks, who fled to Turkey to escape the Zhivkov regime (1954-1989), 
some of whom then settled in northern Cyprus (Demetriou, 2018b).  
 
In the south the 1974 war induced not only internal displacement but also emigration to 
other countries. Many of the Greek-Cypriot refugees who had lost their properties in the war 
migrated to countries of the region (Middle East and North Africa) where development projects 
were underway, and found jobs in the construction industry (Demetriou, 2012). Saudi Arabia and 
Libya are often cited as examples of such labour migration destinations. Others migrated more 
permanently to the UK and Australia. Some Turkish-Cypriots, although not in comparable 
numbers, also emigrated along these routes at the same time. Refugee movements into the 
Republic were minimal until the 1990s and not the subject of a coherent policy. The most 




4. Refugee Protection since the 2000s 
Even though displacement has been an important effect of the conflict, not all displacement 
movements have been met with effective remedies by government authorities. The most 
significant policies concerned the displacements of 1974, whereby the Republic provided 
housing and other support to Greek-Cypriot IDPs, while the Turkish-Cypriot authorities 
implemented a mixture of policies that centred on the nationalisation and redistribution of 
properties vacated by Greek-Cypriots to Turkish-Cypriot displaced and to other settling groups 
(Erdal Ilican, 2011). Before that point, displaced populations were not prioritised by authorities 
(of the Republic) as subjects of protection. In fact, “refugee protection” in the way that it is 
understood in international law, i.e. in terms of the 1951 Convention, was not a real concern 
until the 2000s.    
 
As stated in part 1, refugee protection used to be offered by UNHCR, which has been 
stationed on the island since the years of inter-ethnic violence. Although the 1951 Refugee 
Convention was signed and ratified by the Republic in 1963 and the 1967 Protocol in 1968, a 
Refugee Law relating to third country nationals was only passed in 2000. In 2002, Cypriot 
authorities took over processes of asylum examination and protection from UNHCR. The 
asylum system was further developed in line with EU directives since accession in 2004. The 
refugee protection framework is still in development in the north. Refugees in the north are 
under the protection of UNHCR who examines applications and then seeks relocation 
possibilities to third countries.  
 
This effectively means that refugees on the island can apply for recognition of their 
status through asylum processes in the south only. The fact that entry to the island is possible 
only by air or sea makes the crossing from Turkey by boat, which is the shortest route of all 
possible origin points around the island, the easiest way to enter for those travelling irregularly. 
Hence, for the last two decades, the most frequently used route to access refugee protection has 
been to cross from Turkey into northern Cyprus, then cross the Green Line, and seek asylum in 
the south. This has rendered the Green Line an important factor in formal and informal policies 
of refugee protection and border policing. The Republic has for years raised concerns with the 
EU about the fact that the entry of people via the Green Line is a security issue for which 
Turkey is responsible (Demetriou, 2018). Authorities there have also tended to differentiate in 
statistics between asylum-seekers crossing from the north and those entering the areas they 
control directly. As a result of the conflict, the division of the island determines in fundamental 
ways the protection refugees receive.      
 
Once in the area controlled by the Republic, protection is granted under three statuses: 
(i) refugee protection under the parameters of the Refugee Convention of 1951; (ii) subsidiary 
protection under the EU Qualification Directive of 2004; (iii) humanitarian protection under 
national parameters as decided by the Ministry of Interior. In practice, the numbers of refugees 
recognised under the Convention are much lower than those receiving subsidiary protection, 
even though total numbers have been rising and more so since 2016. The main difference 
between subsidiary and refugee protection inheres in the fact that refugees fleeing war rather 
than targeted political persecution are recognised under the subsidiary protection directive and 
receive restricted rights by comparison to Convention refugees. The most important aspect of 
such restrictions is the limitations to family reunification, which is not covered under subsidiary 
protection (Demetriou, 2019). Humanitarian protection, being a status granted at the discretion 
of the Minister of Interior, can have variable parameters but also carries diminished protections 
as compared with refugee status.  
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The process of status determination comprises two main stages, the initial decision and 
appeal. Since 2017, the European Asylum Support Office, EASO, has been involved in the 
procedure in the Republic, through personnel on the ground. Initial determination by the 
Asylum Service is largely based on interviews. Appeals can be made on both facts and law, 
formerly through the Refugee Reviewing Authority and since 2019 the International Protection 
Administrative Court.6 The shift has meant that the appeals process is now a judicial one, 
whereas under the Refugee Reviewing Authority it was an administrative process. The process 
varies under different conditions (e.g. applications at borders) and is accelerated in cases where 
applicants are deemed to come from safe countries.  
 
The rise in asylum applications and higher numbers of recognition in the last three years, 
in combination with European-wide reforms to the asylum system (Demetriou, 2019) have given 
cause to authorities to reform the system. Key objectives in these reforms seem to be the 
widening of the fast track process and strengthening of the grounds and scope of deportations. 
The imposition of emergency measures during the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020 have 
had an impact on these policies too. The closing of the borders to all air and sea traffic as well as 
the Green Line has been applied to refugees too, as mentioned in part one. At the same time, 
emergency orders regarding the containment of the disease have been applied to impose specific 
restrictions on reception centres where diseases other than COVID-19 were discovered. A case 
that was extensively discussed in the public sphere in May was the lockdown imposed on the 
reception centre at Kokkinotrimithia due to the presence of scabies.7 Such discussions have also 
provided opportunities for the authorities to raise alarm over the presence of foreigners in 
Cyprus, fuelling xenophobic and anti-refugee sentiment. In such discussions, the facts over 
refugee protection (levels of recognition, provision of welfare, access to work and provisions) are 
often distorted and highly securitised, even resulting in opposition to government initiatives. An 
indicative example was the public opposition to the opening of a shelter for vulnerable refugees 
in the Nicosia suburb of Aglantzia, whereby a group of local residents, backed by the far right 
party, opposed government plans on the grounds that the refugees posed a security threat to the 
community, as well as to the country as a whole, since the suburb borders the Green Line and 
houses military barracks.8 These developments, and their apparent contradictions, can be 
explained within a wider context where Cyprus is lobbying the EU for assistance in refugee 
processing by foregrounding the rising asylum application numbers and the even higher rates 
these translate to in proportion to the population vis-à-vis other European countries 
(Demetriou, 2019). This allows the government to claim assistance while at the same time 
imposing a restrictive regime due to its status as an increasingly important EU entrypoint.         
 
The Cypriot approach to refugee recognition therefore, which has diachronically been 
restrictive, is now becoming more so. An important aspect of this restrictive approach is the 










6 https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/cyprus/regular-procedure  





1. The Citizenship Regime 
In Cyprus, refugeehood determines citizenship just as much as citizenship determines 
refugeehood. Displacement has been crucial, section I has shown, not only in shaping the 
demographics of the island in the last two centuries, but also in providing a political discourse 
through which the shorter history of the conflict, and particularly after the division of 1974, has 
been understood. This is emphatically the case for Greek-Cypriot official narratives, but it has 
also been important in Turkish-Cypriot ones. In turn, these narratives are inextricably 
intertwined with understandings about otherness and concomitantly, the governance of others in 
the two polities. This section focuses specifically on citizenship in order to delineate how the 
concepts on which the citizenship regime is based determine the inclusion and exclusion of 
groups and their movements.    
 
Citizenship in Cyprus is primarily guided by jus sanguinis principles, acquired through 
parentage and marriage. This places great significance on family in the determination of 
citizenship, and is directly linked to the determination of communal membership. Under the 
1960 Constitution, citizens of the Republic are separated into two distinct and mutually exclusive 
groups: Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (text box 5.1).9 These groups are defined by ethnic 
origin, language, cultural identity, and religion, but all these characteristics are thought to 
coincide (Art.2, § 1-2). While it is recognised that some individuals may not share these 
characteristics with either of the two groups, the constitution provides that such persons, 
communally or individually (§ 3-4), should choose one of the two communities to belong to. 
Thus, the Armenian, Maronite and Latin communities, which as seen in section I, have different 
origin myths and religions, became part of the Greek-Cypriot community under this provision in 
1960. The Roma community was not asked and became automatically part of the Turkish-
Cypriot community, presumably due to religion. And although the constitution affords the 
possibility of switching communities, the process by which this is done is laborious, and since 
1963, largely defunct. Original assignment into communities, beyond the three religious groups 
mentioned above, was not a matter of choice and remains a question that is never asked.  
 
Where the constitution provides for an automatic switch between communities, it does 
so in reference to women and children, who are by default assigned to the community of the 
husband or father. This represents a patriarchal mentality which essentially renders women and 
children the property of the male family head (Art.2, § 7a; 7b). In doing so, the Constitution 
recognises ethnic belonging as the only mode of existence in social and political life. By making 
families mono-communal, (all members belong to a single community, defined by default as that 
of the father), lines of ethnic purity are at once created and maintained, even as exceptions are 
recognised. Paradoxically, the Constitution does not merely describe who the Cypriot population 
is – it creates that population (Demetriou 2018; also 2013).   
 
Article 2 of the RoC Constitution relating to citizenship: 
 
For the purposes of this Constitution:    
1. the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose 
mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-
Orthodox Church;   
2. the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose 





3. citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article 
shall, within three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to 
either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall 
so opt as a religious group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such 
Community…   
4. a person who becomes a citizen of the Republic at any time after three months of the date of the coming 
into operation of this Constitution shall exercise the option provided in paragraph (3) of this Article 
within three months of the date of his so becoming a citizen;    
5. a Greek or a Turkish citizen of the Republic who comes within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) 
of this Article may cease to belong to the Community of which he is a member and belong to the other 
Community upon -  (a) a written and signed declaration by such citizen to the effect that he desires such 
change, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the 
Turkish Communal Chambers;  (b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other 
Community…  
7. (a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her husband belongs.  (b) a male or 
female child under the age of twenty-one who is not married shall belong to the Community to which his 
or her father belongs, or, if the father is unknown and he or she has not been adopted, to the Community 
to which his or her mother belongs.    
 Text Box 1 
 
In the Republic, some of these provisions have been superseded by later amendments, mainly in 
the sphere of family law. The introduction of civil marriages (1990) and civil partnerships (2015) 
had an impact on the ethnic determinism that pervaded the concept of family. Because up to the 
1990s marriages and family law in general were under the jurisdiction of Communal Chambers 
(institutions that guided the cultural life of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities 
respectively) they fell under the purview of the Church for Greek-Cypriots and were essentially 
defunct for Turkish-Cypriots since 1974 (and partly so in the preceding period). From 1990 
onwards, the Republic implemented changes to the legal parameters on parenthood, 
maintenance, adoption, and divorce, but these initially applied only to the Greek-Cypriot 
community, with a separate law extending provisions to the religious groups within the 
community, Armenians, Maronites, and Latins (Nicolaou, 1996). The application of the civil 
marriage law was extended to include Turkish-Cypriots in 2002, after a European Court of 
Human Rights suit (Selim v. Cyprus).  These later changes to the marriage law have had a 
profound impact on the citizenship regime because they hold the potential of undermining the 
ethnic purity premises on which understandings of citizenship are founded. However, their 
implementation in practice remains limited due to the low numbers of marriages across 
communities. 
 
 In the meantime, in the north, citizenship is also determined by jus sanguinis and acquired 
generally through family connections. Naturalisation policies have been implemented at different 
times, often in a rather arbitrary manner that has been the matter of controversy. They mostly 
involve Turkish nationals and have thus been seen as an extension to the policy of population 
settlement. 
 
 More recent changes to citizenship laws in the Republic allow greater scope for foreign 
nationals to naturalise. Naturalisation policies based on long-term residence were initiated in 
large part through EU harmonisation processes. The right to apply for naturalisation is gained 
after seven years of lawful residence in the Republic.10 This makes it difficult for foreigners who 




seekers may often fall into this category since the long processes of examination of claims create 
opportunities for regular status to lapse. The other major naturalisation scheme is by investment, 
which came into effect following the financial crisis of 2013, and has been heavily criticised by 
local and international bodies, including the EU, as a route to “selling” European passports, 
including to individuals involved in money laundering.11 These two extremes of denying 
citizenship through long, complex, and arbitrary processes on the one hand and offering 
citizenship through speedy and highly professionalised processes (Rakopoulos, forthcoming) 
represent the difference that displacement makes to structures of belonging. It also shows how 
displacement acquires class and economic aspects. On the one extreme, individuals living in 
precarity are rendered further insecure through a prolongation of their displacement, whereas on 
the other, individuals who are financially secure can utilised this security to purchase their 
emplacement in the polity. These changes suggest that even though the citizenship regime is 
becoming more flexible and its intimate connections to the Cyprus conflict are beginning to 
loosen slightly, the shift is geared largely by neoliberal concerns over economic gain. It thus 
appears that the Cyprus polities are still a long way away from redefining citizenship in a way that 
prioritises connection to place, freedom of movement and settlement, and co-existence. The 
next section unpacks in more detail the connections between these enduring conceptions of 
citizenship as primarily ethnic and the governance of otherness on the island.  
 
 
2. Citizenship provisions in the governance of migration and of others 
The implications of the constitutional citizenship provisions outlined above for migration and 
the governance of others in general (migrants, minorities, refugees) are multi-fold and they still 
endure despite the changes described above. In this part, the impact of the citizenship regime’s 
specific parameters on migrants, minorities and refugees is delineated and exemplified. Taken 
together, these examples how how citizenship parameters today, tied as they are to the legacy of 
the conflict, intersect with the categorisation of population groups that have little to do with this 
legacy. In this sense, displacement can be said to cast a long shadow over past and present 
dimensions of citizenship.  
 
Naturalisation: Migrants and refugees who become naturalized are assigned communities, 
rather than choosing them. Community lists are held by the Communal Chambers, which have 
been defunct since the beginning of the conflict in the 1960s, with the Greek-Cypriot Chambers 
having been absorbed into RoC government structures. This means that naturalizations today 
take place into the Greek-Cypriot community by default. However, there have been instances 
where such decisions have been taken arbitrarily, with people being assigned to the Turkish-
Cypriot community due to their religion but without this being consistently applied (Demetriou, 
2019b).  
 
Because of the Cyprus conflict, naturalization (as the link between migration and 
citizenship) is a highly politicized question in the north and the south. Naturalization begins with 
the 1960 constitution and continues on the same governmental logic, which guides citizenship 
today. Thus, economic criteria are now being added to the factors considered in naturalization, 
as seen in the example of citizenship by investment, which targets Russian investors as a key 
group. The political influence of these investors on governmental decision-making has in recent 
years been raised as a concern in public discussions. And in the north, naturalization has been 
and continues to be a highly politicized field, with Turkey widely believed to have a say in 
relevant policy, while at the same time the naturalizations of Turkish citizens in the north often 
come under the scrutiny of Turkish-Cypriot left parties. In one example, the (left-wing party) 
 
11 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/23/exclusive-cyprus-sold-passports-to-criminals-and-fugitives/  
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Minister of Interior in the north, following elections in January 2018, withdrew 175 citizenships 
granted under the previous regime, causing controversy, through the reactions of nationalist 
circles.12  
 
Political and cultural rights: Because political and social rights emanate from community 
membership, they are still determined today by such assignment, including in the case of voting 
rights. Since 2004, Turkish-Cypriots can vote and run for office in the Republic, following a 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights (Aziz v. Cyprus). In the European 
parliamentary elections of May 2019, the main left-wing party in the Republic elected the first 
Turkish-Cypriot into office, an achievement which was officially hailed as a success for the 
democratic process, but which had been preceded by oppositional slander from many sides. This 
result showed that political representation need not equate to ethnic identity; it is equally 
indicative however, of the difficulties of overcoming this connection, bearing in mind that the 
MEP in question was already a high-profile well-integrated academic living in the south.  
 
Rights falling under the Communal Chambers also include education, which under the 
Constitution is divided communally. This means that migrant children are educated in Greek-
Cypriot schools, which, as institutions that originally fell under the Communal Chamber, are 
structured to promote an emphatically Greek-Cypriot identity. For the same reason, education is 
a sphere where the church exercises considerable control, including in traditionally having a say 
over the appointment of Ministers.   
 
Demographic concerns: Because the assignment into communities was for the purposes 
of maintaining a power-sharing governmental system, the definitions of community membership 
imply homogeneous groups who are, as stated above, mutually exclusive in their identities, and 
who are pitted against each other in an adversarial relationship. The size of each community is 
thus a driving factor in political decision-making. The results of the only census undertaken prior 
to the eruption of the conflict counted 18% of the population as Turkish-Cypriot, 80% as 
Greek-Cypriot, and the remaining 2% as belonging to the three religious groups. Since 1960 and 
throughout the peace negotiations, this proportion is taken as the golden standard that should be 
maintained in deciding how to assign a common federal Cyprus citizenship to the population, 
particularly of those naturalised after the division. This has never explicitly been presented as an 
issue in the official design of migration and citizenship policies, but it has been mentioned in less 
formal settings (Demetriou, 2018a) and is often an unstated factor underlying restrictive logics in 
granting citizenship status and in implementing naturalisation policies. 
 
Identification with the enemy group in public discourse: The implied presentation of 
communal affiliation in adversarial terms, as described in the previous point, also informs wider 
public discourse, most pronounced among the far right who see refugees, migrants, and 
naturalised citizens as potential enemies if they have identity traits that resemble “Turks” as laid 
out in the constitutional descriptions (religion, language, etc.). It is indicative that at the height of 
the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, the Minister of Interior suggested that Cyprus could 
accommodate 300 Syrian families, specifying that they should “preferably” espouse of the 
Orthodox Christian faith.13 This adversarial approach also has spatial aspects, mentioned in 
section I, whereby the Green Line becomes important in the classification of foreigners. The 
movement of refugees and migrants across it is understood and policed by RoC authorities as 
related to adversarial policies instigated by Turkey. In this way, migration policy is even further 
securitised. As Turkey is in fact pursuing this tactic of managing refugee movements into Greece 
 




as political manoeuvres in its relations with the EU more forcefully in the last few years, these 
securitisation dynamics are becoming more and more acute across the Green Line also.  
 
Treaty of Establishment provisions: Finally, two further points relate to the citizenship 
regime set up in the 1960 Treaty of Establishment of the RoC rather than the Constitution per 
se.14 On the one hand, the treaty confirms the point about maintenance of population 
proportions, as it explicitly states the 4:1 ratio as one that needs to be maintained in 
naturalizations into the two communities (Annex D, Section 4, § 7d). And on the other hand, it 
assigns two areas within Cyprus, Akrotiri and Dhekelia to UK sovereignty, declaring them 
Sovereign Base Areas of the UK (Main text, Art. 1). However, no special citizenship 
arrangements are made for people living in these areas (Main text, Art. 6), rendering them 
Cypriot citizens. The existence of these base areas creates zones of territorial exception, where 
the law is unclear as to whether refugees and migrants arriving in these spaces are under the 
jurisdiction of RoC or UK authorities. This has created situations whereby refugees arriving on 
the bases have been stranded in them, refusing to transfer to the Republic, and unable to be 
resettled in the UK (Demetriou, 2019b). In the specific situation, it took two decades for the UK 
Home Office to reach an agreement with the refugees for relocation (Demetriou, 2020).  
 
Taken together, these points underscore the fact that the Cypriot citizenship regime, complicated 
as it is because of the dichotomic split into communities, the assignment of non-conforming 
identities into this schema, and the existence of pockets of exceptional jurisdiction, creates a host 
of uncertainties for people seeking regularization in Cyprus, within or outside citizenship models 
(asylum-seekers, refugees, migrants, or persons pursuing naturalization).   
 
3. Discourse and Data in Context 
Policy-making on migration and refugees is largely circumscribed by the parameters used to 
conceptualise citizenship as described thus far. However, in recent years, it is not these 
parameters that are foregrounded. Especially in the last five years, and in line with developments 
in European asylum policy post-2015, the major instrument used in the formulation of policy 
have been migration statistics (Demetriou, 2019). In this respect, the Republic has been lobbying 
the EU for greater support in terms of structures and funding in order to cope with what it 
claims is a concerning rise in irregular migration. These arguments have been successful, owing 
to the fact that Cyprus’ low population size make the proportion of asylum claims to the 
population one of the highest in Europe. While it is the case that in recent years both 
applications and recognitions have been rising, it is less certain whether these numbers should in 
absolute terms be cause for alarm and whether they are enough to implement policies that 
essentially deny protection to people who need it. The purpose of this section is to review these 
statistics and contextualise them. Based on this contextualisation, it would appear that numbers 
per se are less a problem in the wider social context. What seems to be happening instead is that 
statistics is being used to legitimise restrictive policies that are informed primarily by those 
problematic citizenship parameters discussed thus far.    
 
It is important from this perspective, to keep in mind the absolute separation that official 
discourse draws between migrants and refugees.  Even though much of the literature has shown 
that great overlaps exist between the two categories (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; Long, 2013; 
Voutira, 1991; Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Sajjad, 2018; Schuster, 2005; 2011; Nyers, 2006; 2013) 
the separation between the two in absolute terms confers a distinction that is primarily legal. 
Hence, the term ‘migrants’ carries connotations of illegitimacy to a larger extent than ‘refugees’ 
 
14 https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_establishment.pdf  
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does. At the same time, the category ‘migrants’ is further differentiated in terms of regularity 
between those migrants who are properly registered and whose presence is not, in general, 
construed as problematic, and those migrants who do not have valid papers and on whom 
xenophobic discourse primarily focuses. The category ‘refugees’, on the other hand, is often 
differentiated between ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum-seekers’, with the latter term often carrying similar 
connotations of illegitimacy, premised on the belief that many asylum applicants are irregular 
migrants seeking regularisation. In this sense, it is important to look at asylum statistics in 
relation to general migration statistics; and it is more relevant to do so in these terms rather than 
in relation to population size.   
 
In terms of migration, between 1998 and 2018 the Republic of Cyprus reported an 
average of 15,000 migrants per year, about half of which were Europeans (Figure 1).15 Between 
2007 and 2018 the total number of people who acquired Cypriot citizenship was 25,867 with a 
rising trend since 2013. Between 2014 and 2019 long-term residents (on permits of over 5 years) 
increased from 4,116 to 27,168 (Figure 2). In the last ten years there were 167,622 new residence 
permits issued, about half of them for workers (Figure 3). In terms of asylum, during the same 
decade, 8,405 asylum applications received positive decisions at first instance, and 12,350 were 
rejected. Of these, only 1,225 were for refugee status under the Convention, while 7,155 were for 
subsidiary protection and just 65 for humanitarian (Figure 4). There was an additional 11,585 
decisions made on appeals with only 1,025 being successful, and only 175 for Convention status, 
670 being for subsidiary protection and 180 humanitarian. Finally, in terms of policing, almost 
8000 people were refused entry to the Republic in the same period, while 62,760 were found to 
be illegally present. Of those, 25,385 were ordered to leave and 24,755 were returned.  
 
     
 














In all these statistics, which paint the general picture of regular migration, the period 
around 2013 appears as a turning point, with low migration numbers across most categories. 
This would most reasonably be related to the financial crisis experienced in that year, when the 
country saw the near-collapse of its banking sector (Zenios, 2013; Pashardes and Pashourtidou, 
2013; Clerides, 2014). The impending crisis had slowed the economy slightly prior to the collapse 
and impacted it severely for a long time after. This would have made Cyprus a not very attractive 
destination for labour migration. In contrast, the years at the end of the first decade of the 
millennium had seen a property boom (Michaelides, 2014; Clerides and Pashourtidou, 2007). 
Following Cyprus’s entry to the EU in 2004, this would have been a pull factor. Similar 
attraction can be gleaned in the last five years, when the economy appears to be recovering.   
 
The same uneven pattern is observed in irregular migration. Persons classified as found 
to be illegally present in the country numbered 8,230 in 2011. This was the highest number for 
the years between 2008 and 2017, while a sharp drop to 4,980 was recorded in 2014, the lowest 





























































years, adult males comprised the majority of this population and girls the smallest minority. 
Asylum applications (not in graph), for which data is recorded in a longer timeframe, evidence an 
increase following Cyprus’s entry to the EU (from 950 in 2002 to 9,675 in 2004), a steady drop 
from 2007 (6,780 applications) to 2013 (1,255 applications) and a slow rise until 2016 (2,940 
applications). A comparison indicates that ‘illegal presence’ does not necessarily correlate with 
asylum applications. For example, the high number of “illegals” for 2011 (8,230) does not map 
onto, in any obvious way, the asylum application numbers lodged for that year, which were less 
than 2,000. What is better correlated are the peaks in both rejection decisions and arrests in that 
year (figures 4 and 5). This in turn might suggest that a hostile environment could have worked 
to deter applications. The rates of rejection have been diachronically high, falling only around 
2013, when, as we have seen, application numbers were also lower, and then beginning to rise 
again (Figure 4). Also, in respect to positive decisions, until 2009 the protection offered was 
mostly under subsidiary status, i.e., not affording the full rights of refugee protection under the 
terms of the 1951 Convention. This would have had repercussions on the rights of people to 
create a settled life in Cyprus. In reading these numbers, one should keep in mind the argument 
that policing and categorization create the situations of ‘illegality’ that demography then 
documents (Luibheid, 2013; Andresson, 2014; Tazzioli, 2014; Rygiel, 2011). At the same time, it 
should also be remembered that regularity and irregularity are hardly mutually exclusive. Shifts 
may occur between them, as when persons overstay their visas, or gain rights through work 
arrangements or marriage.  
 
Overall, what the reported numbers show is that regular migration (not considered a 
problem) far outweighs irregular migration by 4:1, in terms of absolute total numbers over the 
last decade (figure 6). In fact, this ratio has been decreasing rather than increasing in the last five 
years, in which discourses have become more alarmist. This begs a question as to whether the 
situation is as dire as public discourse and authorities present it to be. Even starker is the 
difference between categories of protected people and regular migrants, where the former 
account for just 5% of the whole migrant population, and just 3% of the total foreign population 
(figure 7). For the case of refugees protected under the 1951 Convention, this percentage drops 
to less than 1%. The argument therefore that refugee movements into the country pose a threat 
to services, the social fabric, and the system as a whole, appears weak. What seems to be the case 
is rather that discourses of alarm legitimise and support a hostile environment that pushes people 
into irregularity.   
 
     
Fig 6      Fig 7 
 
Although these statistics refer to exclusively to the Republic, much of what they 
represent is connected to the situation in the north, which is neither well documented, nor 
transparently managed. Turkey control over politics in the north, primarily through ensuring 
financial aid in exchange for influence over policies (Bozkurt, 2013), has a particular impact on 
population demographics. As institutions are not stringently monitored, statistics produced by 
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Turkish-Cypriot authorities are scant and relatively arbitrary.16 The education sector is 
increasingly being seen as one of the routes through which shifts between regular and irregular 
migration occur. 17 The higher education sector has developed into one of the most important 
areas attracting foreigners to northern Cyprus (Katircioglu, 2010). There are currently 16 
universities, reportedly with a total student population of 101,000. Of those, 88,000 are foreign 
and hail from 135 countries, 56,000 of them from Turkey.18 In this field too, data is not readily 
available. 
 
The lack an asylum system in place in the north effectively means that statistics in this 
field are altogether absent. Applications are dealt with through UNHCR, with decisions aimed 
primarily at relocation of those afforded protection. A law to institute a domestic framework for 
refugee protection has been discussed since 2015. The draft law prohibits refoulement and 
provides protections for minors, including unaccompanied minors, and provides rights to 
residence and work under a clause for humanitarian grounds. A 2012 report by the Refugee 
Rights Association registered 221 asylum applications in the years between 1999 and 2011, with 
yearly numbers ranging from 1 to 43 applications (Polili, 2012: 90). It also reported that the vast 
majority of applicants (85%) hailed from Iraq, Palestine, and Syria. A significant number of 
asylum applicants in the north are rejected and deported (ibid), while many are also reportedly 
pushed back at the border. 
 
The fact that significant numbers of people seeking international protection who arrive 
in northern Cyprus actually cross the Green Line and file asylum applications with the authorities 
of the RoC is an important point which clearly shows how the Cyprus conflict is affecting 
migration and protection. Although this fact has been raised as a concern with EU authorities 
since the early 2000s, it is interesting to note that statistics regarding people who are “refused 
entry at the land border” are not provided to Eurostat, presumably because the Green Line is 
not recognised as a state border. This is indicative of how parameters related to the conflict 
relate to migration and refugee protection today, but are not consistently treated as issues to 
address politically (e.g. in negotiation or, even less so, collaboration, with Turkish-Cypriots) 
rather than managerially (asking the EU to assist in management). The last part of this article 
addresses the implications of this situation, where the nexus between migration and the Cyprus 
conflict is largely determined by the exclusions of the citizenship regime. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: Implications for policy and practice 
The escalation of the crisis in Syria has rendered Cyprus’s position as a relatively peaceful 
European Union outpost in the region immensely significant. In the last quarter of 2015, there 
were three shipwrecks close to the southern shoreline, a phenomenon that had not been seen for 
years. Many of the applications for refugee protection in the RoC had, until then, been filed by 
individuals crossing from the north or by individuals who had entered as migrants and had lost 
their regular status. This change is indicative of wider, and more profound changes to the 
patterns and routes of migration, which seem set to continue in the coming years and as long as 
conflicts in the region remain unresolved. Continuing instability in Syria, the capacity of 
 
16 The 2011 population census registered 286,257 people in northern Cyprus, of whom 190,494 held TRNC 
citizenship (66.5%). Another 80,550 were Turkish citizens (dual citizenships counted within the TRNC number), 
corresponding to 28% of the population. All other groups, 0.3% and 1.3% of the total, numbered just over 1,000 at 
most, and hailed from the UK, Turkic republics, Nigeria, Iran, Pakistan, and Bulgaria 
(http://www.devplan.org/Frame-tr.html).  
17 For example, in the early months of 2018 concerns were raised about exploitation rings targeting Zimbabwean 
students (https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-students-in-cyprus-journey-of-broken-promises/).  
18 http://www.studyinnorthcyprus.org/?page_id=5422  
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neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, to accommodate refugees, their 
policies vis-à-vis the EU, the terms of operation of FRONTEX, the EU’s border agency, in the 
region, border policies in the region and the EU, as well as migration and refugee protection 
policies in the EU and beyond, are all factors impacting on refugee and migrant arrivals in 
Cyprus. Collecting data both on movement and on policies is thus crucial to identifying the 
changing position and role of Cyprus in this crisis-- in the region, and in the EU. Considered 
analysis can identify ways in which Cyprus can play a positive role in this crisis, from mapping 
the local situation in terms of humanitarian responses thus far, policy frameworks currently 
under formation, and public discourses on migration which make reference to security threats 
and concerns and to humanitarian needs. Also relevant to consider is the relation between local 
dynamics around the negotiations: how far peace-building arrangements, for example, account 
for regional instability and threats, as well as the need to integrate growing migrant and refugee 
populations in the federal state are important questions that have not been discussed in the 
negotiations. Equally, the ways in which failure to reach an agreement will impact on refugee 
protection capacities in the two polities and on future migration routes also needs to be 
considered.  
 
Since 2015, reception infrastructures in Cyprus have been given more attention, and 
funding has been channelled to improve them. However, dire problems still exist. The EU-
Turkey statement issued in March 2016, under which migrants can be returned to Turkey in 
exchange for the relocation of Syrian refugees, bears no relevance for policy-makers in Cyprus, 
who do not maintain relations with Turkey because of the conflict. Whether this will have any 
substantial effect on patterns of migration vis-à-vis Cyprus is still to be seen. But having in mind 
that the statement has been criticized heavily by human rights organizations, the RoC’s choice 
not to apply it would appear to afford some space, albeit little, for better protection than that 
afforded in places where the statement is applied. Cyprus participates in the operations of 
FRONTEX and has hosted meetings on the island. Although information on this relationship is 
scant, possibilities for tighter cooperation are likely if migration dynamics intensify.19 
 
Given current trends, it appears that the field of migration into Cyprus will still change in 
the coming years. It also appears that as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, the 
impact on migration, along the lines mentioned here, and perhaps in new ways yet to be seen, 
will continue. As the report has tried to show, it is an area that deserves more attention from 
policy-makers and researchers, if better conditions and procedures are to be put in place in an 
effective manner. Areas that should be given particular attention include: 
 
(i) The relevance of the Green Line as a space from which migrants and refugees 
cross. One aspect that has not yet been considered in research and policy is the 
movement in the opposite direction, i.e., of migrants in the south who choose, 
for various reasons, to cross to the north and seek employment there or in 
Turkey. The factors involved in this movement remain to be explored, alongside 
their impact on the migration field more generally. 
(ii) The relevance of the Cyprus conflict in structuring the rhetoric on migration. In 
this respect, the discourse espoused by the far right has been given particular 
attention and shown to contribute substantially in the securitization of migration 
in conjunction with the call to close the checkpoints. At the same time, the 
adversarial logic on which perceptions of demographics are based and which 
emanate from as far back as the constitution of 1960 and its citizenship regime, 
 
19 http://www.police.gov.cy/police/police.nsf/All/C513B54A8B39D23EC2257A2F002CC76C  
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has also been shown to still guide the ways in which migrants and refugees are 
treated. A key area of concern here is integration, which has been shown to be 
particularly difficult in Cyprus, and as one of the case-studies shows, remains so 
in cases of naturalization, even if this occurred generations prior. The picture 
painted in this respect is bleak, and is perhaps the main area on which efforts 
should be expended, i.e., creating more welcoming conditions of living.     
(iii) Another difficulty with perceptions of migration pertains to the north, where the 
demographic orientation of Turkish policy in settling people at different points 
through the years has cemented views of intolerance amongst Turkish-Cypriots, 
including even the progressive pro-peace side. This hampers communication on 
the issue between the sides, and effectively precludes possibilities of 
coordination, even on the civil society side, except for NGOs focussing explicitly 
on refugee rights. Better communication on this issue will undoubtedly be 
beneficial to the coordination of policy, reception, and integration, and could 
prove an entry point for a breakthrough in the peace negotiations as well.  
(iv) The impact of new dynamics post-2015 is yet to be determined, but the noted 
indications must be given further consideration and examined explicitly for their 
intersection with local conflict dynamics. 
In sum, the current migration regime indicates serious problems, a substantial proportion of 
which emanate from factors relating to the Cyprus conflict. New dynamics developing in the 
region around Cyprus need to be seen as opportunities for addressing these problems, rather 
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